The problem nobody has actually fixed
None of this addresses the thing that should worry anyone about to hand a browser their email, banking, and shopping logins: indirect prompt injection is not solved, and the companies building these products say it might not be solvable at all.
Brave's security team disclosed a working exploit against Comet in mid-2025 — a hidden instruction embedded in an ordinary webpage could get the browser to read a user's email or reach into an active banking session, simply because Comet fed part of the page's content straight to its underlying model without separating that content from the user's actual instructions. A related exploit nicknamed CometJacking used a crafted URL parameter to achieve something similar. Atlas had its own version within days of launching: researchers at NeuralTrust found a parsing flaw in Atlas's address bar that let a malicious, URL-shaped string get treated as a trusted command rather than plain text.
By December 2025, OpenAI stopped framing this as a bug to patch and started framing it as a structural property of the category. The company's own blog post called prompt injection unlikely to ever be fully solved, comparing it to social engineering — a threat you manage, not one you eliminate. Internal red-teaming had already turned up a new class of injection attacks even after the initial hardening pass. The UK's National Cyber Security Centre reached the same conclusion independently in early December, warning that these attacks may never be totally mitigated.
The mechanism is simple to state and hard to fix. Every webpage a browser agent visits becomes part of the same context the model uses to interpret your instructions, and there's no reliable structural marker separating "this is what the user asked for" from "this is text a stranger put on a webpage." An agent capable of acting inside your logged-in sessions is, by the same design, an agent that can be redirected by whatever those sessions happen to contain.